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THINKING AHEAD:
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE 21ST
CENTURY
Thomas L. Eggert*
The United States has made notable progress in cleaning up the
environment over the last 30 years. Our nation's air, land and water are, in
almost all cases, significantly cleaner than they were only a few decades
ago.' Before declaring victory though, we must acknowledge that some
environmental problems are getting worse, and the nature of our
environmental problems has changed. Many environmental problems are
now global problems, as opposed to problems that could be dealt with at
the national or state level. Problems have become diffuse, with no clearly
identifiable source and with a lengthy delay between cause and effect,
whereas before problems were immediately obvious with distinct sources.
Finally, environmental problems have become very complex, changing
from the relatively simple problems such as thinning eggshells due to
pesticide abuse .
Government agencies continue to address this new generation of
problems with tools designed for a generation of problems now largely
behind us. The time has come to develop complementary tools designed
for these new problems.
As environmental regulatory agencies investigate new approaches to
environmental protection, the way questions are phrased has a profound
impact on the answers generated. If the question concerns how an
environmental agency can do a better job working with businesses to
ensure that they act in an environmentally responsible manner, then the
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1 See Environmental Protection Agency, Air Quality Trends (1995); Environmental
Protection Agency, National Water Quality Inventory: Report to Congress (1996).
2 See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 206 (1963). Rachel Carson is credited with
making environmental threats understandable to the public. Much of her work focused
on the impact of DDT on eggshells, and led to the banning of DDT by the Environmental
Protection Agency.
answer must involve some type of cooperative effort between the
environmental agency and the relevant businesses. If, however, the
question concerns how an environmental agency can best use its resources
to protect the environment, then the answer may require the agency to
work with many different groups. It is my belief that environmental
regulatory agencies should be asking the second question. Further, one
possible answer to the question of how to develop effective, supplemental
approaches to protecting and enhancing the environment lies in educating
and influencing the public, specifically with respect to consumer
purchasing decisions.
BACKGROUND
There is a surprising consensus that current environmental protection
and enhancement strategies are not sufficient to meet the environmental
challenges of the next century.
3
According to work done by the Aspen Institute, business, government
and environmental representatives agree that there are more effective
approaches to environmental protection that can reduce environmental
impacts in ways that reduce costs and inefficiencies and encourage
innovation and technological advances.
4
Unfortunately, most of the alternative strategies currently being
considered involve improving relationships with business.
5
Environmental agencies have been exploring the benefits of
cooperative relationships with businesses for more than seven years.
Examples include the Council of Great Lakes Governors' Great Printers
Project6 (started in 1992), EPA's Project XL and Common Sense Initiative
(started in 1994), Texas' Clean Texas 2000 programs7 (started in 1992),
3 See, e.g., William D. Ruckelshous & Karl Hausker, The Environmental Protections
System in Transition: Toward a More Desirable Future, Final Report of the Enterprise
for the Environment, 1997 The Center for Strategic and Int'l Stud. 4; The Alternative
Path: A Cleaner, Cheaper Way to Protect and Enhance the Environment, 1996 The
Aspen Inst. 2.
4 See Aspen, supra note 3, at 2.
5 For example, the Environmental Protection Agency has created a number of partnership
oriented programs over the past five or more years. One of the earliest of these was the
33/50 program, which was followed by the Environmental Leadership Program, Project
XL, the Common Sense Initiative, Waste Wise, and others.
6 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GREAT PRINTERS PROJECT: PROGRESS IN
MAKING POLLUTION PREVENTION STANDARD PRACTICE IN PRINTING INDUSTRY (1994).
This document was produced by the Great Printing team and signed by the Governors of
the Great Lakes states, the heads of the Environmental Defense Fund, Printing Industry
of America, and the EPA. Id.
7 TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION COMMITTEE, CLEAN TEXAS 2000:
ENVIRONMENTAL PARTNERSHIPS FACT SHEET (1995).
and recognition programs that exist in virtually all states. All of these
efforts are premised on the idea that rewarding business for acting
responsibly will produce environmentally responsible businesses.
However, as regulatory agencies prepare for the 21st century, they find
themselves evaluating the efficacy of these programs. Although these
programs have significantly decreased tensions between the agencies and
the business community, they have been only marginally effective at
creating new incentives to protect and enhance the environment.
Reliance on voluntary partnership development as the shining star in a
new constellation of environmental protection tools is misplaced. Project
XL and the Common Sense Initiative have been severely criticized for
their lack of results.
8
Similarly, the Great Printers Project has not produced enough interest
within the printing community to justify continued funding.9
Although voluntary partnerships have been shown to work well in
other countries, 10 the US has a very different history and cultural
background which makes the value of these voluntary partnerships lie in
speculative potential rather than actual accomplishments.
In searching for a system to supplement current environmental
protection and enhancement strategies, the government seems to have
been asking the wrong question. The answer has repeatedly come back as
"partnership development." However, partnerships have not lived up to
the government's expectations.
This is not to say that developing more cooperative relationships with
the business community has been entirely futile. It has not. Improving
adversarial relationships will pay dividends, yet it is presently uncertain
whether those dividends will include the enlightened understanding that
will produce improved corporate environmental performance without the
threat of sanctions.
DISCUSSION
Regulatory agencies have been trying to "evolve" from mandating an
environmental ethic (which in most cases has resulted in the development
of a compliance ethic, not an environmental one) to encouraging one.
8 See T. DAVIES & J. MAZUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION: DOES THE U.S. SYSTEM
WORK 28 (1997).
9 At the Great Plains Regional Meeting on April 24, 1997, representatives from the
printing community could not commit to sustaining project activities once funding ran
out. Lack of demand from the trade association membership was cited as the prevailing
reason.
10 See HUEY D. JOHNSON, GREEN PLANS 45 (1995).
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Agencies are replacing the old sanctions of fines and lawsuits with
incentives and relationship building. Yet, as these agencies "evolve", they
seem to ignore the reasons which motivate most companies to comply
with the laws. In the vast majority of cases it is because they are afraid of
the consequences of being caught "out of compliance.""l
Absent regulations, business would be much less concerned with the
environmental impact of their production process or products.
This fundamental truth, that business is concerned about
environmental emissions because the government is concerned about
them, must influence the consideration of alternative approaches. An
alternative approach that replaces this incentive, must create an equally
compelling incentive to replace it. One candidate that regulatory agencies
have little experience with is the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith's
market. 12
Market incentives come in many forms. Air emissions trading is one
example of market forces at work.
13
The Superfund program's enlistment of lenders and insurers as "quasi-
regulators," encouraging and overseeing cleanups of contaminated sites is
another example.
14
In both instances, the environmental regulatory agencies were
relatively minor players, mostly responsible for answering market
participant questions. The results have been impressive. S02 emissions
trading has achieved S02 reductions greater than those required, and
sooner than required, under the regulatory program.
15
In addition, the industry has saved over $2 billion.16
The story is the same in the area of cleanups. Thousands of sites are
being cleaned up because lenders and insurance companies are acting in
their best financial interests and minimizing their risks. 
17
11 See SCOTT E. DAVID ET AL., WISCONSIN DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION AND REGULATION: SIFTING REALITY FROM RHETORIC
(1998). See generally Tom Eggery, Moving Forward by Looking Back. The Role of
Enforcement in Promoting Pollution Prevention, 9 POLLUTION PREVENTION R. 1 (1999).
12 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (1776).13 See T. DAVIES & J. MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE U.S.: EVALUATING THE
SYSTEM 52-65 (1998).
14 See Environmental Law Institute, The Environmental Forum.15 See DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 13, at 56.16 See id. at 58.
17 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: STATE VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS
PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE CLEANUPS 18-21 (1997).
By elevating the supervisory role of lenders to a legal duty backed by
Superfund liability, Congress empowered lenders to function as a second
level of enforcement of environmental laws.
18
By creating potential liability for undiscovered contamination, the
government created an incentive for banks and the lending community as
a whole to compel cleanups as a condition of a loan. Insurance companies
are also setting policy prices based upon known risks, thereby
encouraging companies to fully identify the risks and to remediate them.
Clearly, experimenting with the invisible hand of the market is producing
results.
The more traditional understanding of the invisible hand holds that
consumers express their preferences through their purchase decisions.
Producers are rewarded for meeting the needs of the consumers at a price
which consumers are willing to pay. Producers that fail to attract
consumers ultimately disappear from the market.
Information is one of the keys to this exchange between producers and
consumers. Limited or inadequate information may result in a mis-
communication of signals between consumers and producers. In our
current market, consumers are seldom, if ever, provided with information
about the relative environmental strengths and weaknesses of competing
products. In other countries, environmental labels, or eco-labels are used
on a great array of consumer products. Eco-label programs can be found
in Europe, 19 the Far East,20 and North America.
21
These labels are designed both to educate the consumer on the relative
environmental merit of a particular product and to recognize and reward
companies that are performing in an environmentally superior manner.
They are found on products from soaps and detergents to toilet paper to
personal care products.
22
In this country, we do not have a widely recognized eco-label system.
It is very difficult for consumers to compare the relative environmental
qualities of products. Yet, the logic of the market suggests that if
customers demand or select in favor of companies that demonstrate an
18 See Sara A. Goldberg, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Shaping a New Legal Rule, 4
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 78 (1995).
19 See generally Julian Morris & Lynn Scarlett, Buying Green: Consumers Products and
the Environment, 1996 REASON INST. 50 (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdom all have eco-labeling programs).
20 See generally id. (Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore,
China, and Taiwan all have eco-labeling programs).
21 See generally id. (Canada and, to a very limited extent, the United States, have eco-
labeling programs).
22 See generally id.
environmental ethic, companies will respond by demonstrating their
environmental ethic. This power of the consumer is a power that is
untapped by environmental regulatory agencies.
It is possible that regulatory agencies could influence the choices of
consumers by providing information on the relative environmental
performance of competitors. Recent studies also suggest that a majority of
U.S. consumers prefer to buy environmentally friendly products.
23
These survey findings are supported by the demonstrated purchasing
behaviors of German citizens. Products labeled as environmentally
friendly by the German Institute for Quality Assurance and Certification
command a distinct market share, and there is stiff competition for the
right to display the label.24
RATIONALE
This is not a call for total privatization of environmental protection.
The government can not abdicate responsibility for developing standards
and enforcing regulations. However, empowering the private sector, and
the public at large, to bring independent pressure on polluting businesses
is not an abdication of authority. Rather, utilizing the market forces at
work in the private sector would represent an expanded view of the
responsibilities and abilities of regulatory agencies. In an era of dwindling
resources, educated and empowered consumers should allow regulatory
agencies to focus their limited resources on dealing with truly bad actors.
In an era of government re-invention, many environmental regulatory
agencies have identified citizen empowerment as a desirable activity to be
pursued. The strength of these approaches can be seen in the
accomplishments of the SARA Title III program (the Community Right
25To Know or TRI legislation).
By annually publishing a list of the largest emitters of pollution in each
state, known as the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), the EPA allows public
pressure to influence corporate decision making.
26
23 See Harvey Hartman, Myths and Realities of the "New" Green Economy, ENVTL.
QUALITY MGMT., Winter 1996, at 47, 47-55.
24 See INGRID LAUDE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LABEL: A GERMAN SYSTEM FOR
IDENTIFYING ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY PRODUCTS 1-15 (1995) (on file with
author); Jans Hemmelskamp & Karl Ludwig Brockmann, Environmental Labels-The
German "Blue Angel," 29 FUTURES 67 (1997).
21 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§
300-330, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
26 See Carol J. Forrest, The TRI, P2, and Public Dialogue, 6 POLLUTION PREVENTION
REV. 1 (1996).
Experience to date with the Right To Know legislation suggests that
the public can, and does, influence business decisions on emissions.
27
The public availability of TRI information has had another far-
reaching effect: it has acted as a catalyst for increased dialogue among
environmental activists, community residents, industry, and government
on a wide range of environmental and community issues.
28
The opportunity for regulatory agencies to work with consumers and
the public should be expanded. Work is underway in many agencies to
make data more accessible and useful.29
This type of work supports a broad strategy for incorporating the
public into the environmental protection effort as it takes advantage of
trends evident within many regulatory agencies to seek greater public
involvement in environmental decision making.
However, merely making information available to the public is not
sufficient to create consumers that are ready to influence the market.
Targeted education of consumers is important. So too is providing
consumers with access to technical assistance, so that they can understand
and use information appropriately.
One such effort underway in Wisconsin arose out of a partnership
between the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, the Wisconsin
Fabricare Association (the dry cleaners' state trade association), the
University of Wisconsin-Extension and Citizens for a Better Environment.
Together, this group developed a recognition program for dry cleaners that
emphasized the efficient use of the solvents used in the dry cleaning
process and encouraged the use of water, soap and human labor for many
traditional "dry"cleaning jobs. Companies that were very efficient with
their use of solvents, and which did a high percentage of their cleaning
with soap and water were awarded with five stars, while less superior
performers received one to four stars. The public was then educated on the
benefit of patronizing a dry cleaner that was participating in this program,
and if a choice existed, to choose the most environmentally efficient dry
cleaner. After four years, the program continues to attract the interest of
additional dry cleaners, primarily because of the interest of consumers.
Though far from conclusive proof that the power of the consumer can
drive companies to become more efficient, this effort provides support for
27 See Paul Hilton & Alice Tepper Marlin, The Role of the Nonprofit in Rating
Environmental Performance, 3 CORP. ENVTL. STRATEGY 21 (1996).
28 See Forrest, supra note 26.
29 See NANCY BARKER & TOM ATEN, WISCONSIN DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, EQ
FACILITIES DESIGN DOCUMENT (1995).
the proposition that the government can work through consumers to
influence choices that businesses make.
CONCLUSION
By continuing to focus heavily on business, environmental regulatory
agencies limit their ability to develop strategies that are sufficient to meet
the environmental challenges of tomorrow. However, by providing
credible, readily available information to customers in an effort to
encourage responsible choices, environmental agencies can empower
customers to bring pressure on manufacturers to minimize emissions.
Customer pressure is entirely different than regulatory pressure, but
potentially no less effective. Businesses that fail to respond appropriately
to customer pressure suffer even more devastating consequences than
those that fail to respond to regulatory pressure.
Accessible, trustworthy information is one of the greatest limitations
that the consuming public faces. If regulatory agencies can aggressively
act to fill this gap through a wide variety of approaches, it will have begun
to enlist legions of informed buyers that can make a difference in how
business approaches environmental decisions.
Agencies must slowly shift environmental protection power to
consumers. Few, if any, businesses currently identify customer pressure as
the primary reason for minimizing environmental emissions. However,
lessons from other countries (notably Germany and the Scandinavian
countries) 30 suggest that market pressure holds great potential in this
country. It is time to investigate that potential.
30 See Laude, supra note 24; Hemmelskamp & Brockman, supra note 24.
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